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This paper argues that judicial independence role in Egypt lacks any form of
checks and balance, which reinstate the role of judicial autonomy over judicial
independence. The judicial independence is a debatable issue in the contem-
porary history in Egypt. Judges, lawyers, and activist called for judicial reform
after the success of the 2011 Revolution. In response, the paper presents the
concept of judicial independence in Egypt, which reflects an understanding of
autonomy rather than independence. More specifically, there is a clear lack of
understanding of checks-and-balances in theory and practice of judicial inde-
pendence. In this regard, the question of separation of powers and between the
judiciary, the legislative and the executive imposes a call for reform for the role
of the Minister of Justice, the Judicial Inspection Department, and the president
of the primary court over judges. For that matter, this paper answers several
questions regarding the formulation, organization, and separation of power in
the Egyptian judiciary.
Keywords: Judiciary; Judicial independence; Judicial Autonomy; Judicial Reform; Is-
lamic Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The judiciary is a cornerstone in protecting liberty and impartial
justice against executive oppression and other forms of executive or
bureaucratic abuse.' The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court
(hereinafter SCC) maintains that judicial independence is the primary
foundation of the supremacy of the law.2 It protects both individuals and
-C institutions against legislative and executive violations of fundamental
rights.' Usually, there is a mixture of judicial independence and judicial
autonomy. While the former is based on checks and balances between
executive, legislative and judicial authorities, the latter is based on
putting up barriers between the three authorities.
Judicial independence and judicial autonomy have different
characteristics that distinguish one from the other. Judicial
independence involves four main issues. Firstly, that judges are free
from any form of external pressure.' They shall be free from any
commitment except to justice. Secondly, court decisions are subject to
a amendment only through a judicial adjudication, rather than executive
6 or legislative methods, unless there is a constitutional amendment.6
U Thirdly, the law shall be the only source to determine judicial decisions,
rather than any form of political pressure.' Fourthly, the independent
1. Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21
DAYTON L. REv. 565, 567 (1995-96).
2. The Supreme Constitution Court Judgment no. 27 states "the meaning and the
effects of judicial independence are not only a guarantee against interference of
the executive authority in justice affairs, but it is also a guarantee against exec-
utive interference in its administration. Judicial Independence is introduction
to the supremacy of law".
3. Cox, supra note 1, at 571.
4. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silances, Cristian Pop Eleches, & Andrei
Shleifer, Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445, 447-449 (2004);
see also, the reform shall come from within the judiciary, David Risley, Egypt's
Judiciary: Obstructing or Assisting Reform, 1 MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE POLICY
Focus 4, 10-11 (2016).
5. La Porta et al., supra note 4. at 566.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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judiciary is subject to checks and balances with the executive and
legislative authority. It is not above the other two authorities; instead,
it is equal and accountable to both. Nonetheless, the form of checks
and balances differs from one country to another. Hence, the first three
issues are core issues of judicial independence, while the fourth raises
the question of separation of powers.
Judicial autonomy, on the other hand, is an extreme form of judicial
independence. It indicates that there is no form of supervision of checks
and balances between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative
authorities. In addition, factors that identify judicial independence and
judicial autonomy have four unique features. Firstly, the judicial budget
does not fall under any supervision from legislative authorities, nor is
it publicly discussed. Secondly, judges perform administrative duties
and tasks of the judiciary. It may be argued that the Minister of Justice
(hereinafter MoJ) interferes in the judicial administration. However, as
indicated in this research, the MoJ is a judge who has been chosen by
the Supreme Judicial Council (hereinafter SJC). Even though the MoJ
is part of the executive authority, the MoJ also enjoys the approval of
most of the members of the judiciary. Thirdly, members of the judiciary P
manage the judicial appointment process.
Even though the executive authority interferes with the security c
checks, this has a negative impact on the process. The executive authority 2
has the capacity to exclude certain candidates who have political or
criminal records. However, it is unable to propose any candidate for
appointment. Fourthly, judges are accountable to their peers/judges
rather than to the two other authorities. Judicial independence has
repeatedly been implemented in the constitutional history of the
Egyptian judiciary throughout different periods, except during the
period of socialism.' Even though the 1923 and 1930 Constitutions
did not mention this independence, there was a separate judicial
independence law, which formed the foundation for the concurrent
judicial authority laws.' After the 1952 Military Coup, the 1956, 1958,
1963 and 1971 Constitutions maintained the judicial independence of
the bench. They did not, however, provide any form of independence
8. AMR SHALAKANY, IZDIHAR WA-INHIYAR AL-NUKHBA AL-QANUNIYYA
AL-MISRIYAA 277 (Cairo: Shorouk Publisher 2013).
9. Judicial Independence Law (1943) and Judicial Independence Law (1952).
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to the institution. After the 2011 Revolution, judges sustained an
unprecedented form of independence that reflected their understanding
of full autonomy of the institution. The 2013 Constitution confirmed
judicial independence.o This is also addressed in section three under
the title "The Judicial Authority." Article 186 of the Constitution
includes a separate article to ensure judicial independence."1 The 2014
Constitution takes a similar approach to that of 2013 with regard to
judicial independence. 1 2
The discussion is divided into three main sections. The first
discusses judicial independence in Egypt, which has two major
features. Firstly, judicial independence on the bench is concerned with
individual judges. This includes judges' immunity and the irrevocability
of their status and positions. Secondly, judicial independence of the
institution in Egypt is considered a complicated issue, especially
after the formulation of the present Constitution. The SCC, the State
Council, the Public Prosecution Bureau, the military judiciary, the
Administrative Prosecution, the State Cases' Authority, and aides to
the judiciary were granted autonomy from executive and legislative
authorities. The second section tackles the role of the separation of
O
u powers between the judicial and executive branches. This issue takes a
different turn as a result of judicial autonomy being applied. It ignores
any form of checks and balances between these authorities and bans
any form of interference in judicial affairs." The judiciary monopolizes
10. The 2013 Constitution, art. 94 states "the state is subject to the law, while the
independence, immunity and impartiality of the judiciary are essential guar-
antees for the protection of rights and freedoms".
11. The 2014 Constitution, art. 186 states "judges are independent, cannot be dis-
missed, are subject to no other authority by the law, and are equal in rights and
duties. Law regulates the conditions and procedures for their appointment,
secondment, delegation, discipline and retirement. They may not be fully or
partly delegated except to bodies and to perform tasks that are identified by
law, provided that all the foregoing maintains the independence and impar-
tiality of the judiciary and judges and prevents conflicts of interest. The rights,
duties and guarantees granted to them are specified by law".
12. Id. art. 184 states "the judiciary is independent. It is vested in the courts of jus-
tice of different types and degrees, which issue their judgments in accordance
with the law. Law defines its powers. Interference in judicial affairs or in pro-
ceedings is a crime to which no statute of limitations may be applied".
13. Id. art. 185.
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the accountability and appointment of its members.1 4 The third and
final section proposes reform for the previous dilemma presented in
this research.
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
EGYPT
A. The Present State of Judicial Independence in Egypt
The 2014 Constitution has arguably granted the judiciary unprecedent- PJ
ed privileges towards its full independence to reach the level of judi- -
cial autonomy. These steps are considered a setback for the checks and S
o
balances system and the principle of public transparency." The 2014
Constitution grants independence of administration, budget, and per- p
sonnel. Article 184 states that "the judiciary is independent. It is vested E
in the courts of justice of different types and degrees, which issue their
judgment in accordance with the law. Its powers are defined by law."16
As far as the independence of the administration is concerned,
Article 185 states, "All judicial bodies administer their own affairs."
In terms of budget independence, the same Article, paragraph 2 states
that "each judicial body has an independent budget, whose items are
all discussed by the House of Representatives. After approving each
budget, it is incorporated in the state budget as a single figure, and
their opinion is consulted on the draft laws governing their affairs.""'
For the independence of the judges on the bench, the constitution lays
out the general rule related to such independence in Article 186.1' It
14. Id. art. 189.
15. Id. art. 185/1 states "[a]ll judicial bodies administer their own affairs. Each has
an independent budget, whose items are all discussed by the House of Repre-
sentatives".
16. Id. art. 184.
17. Id. art. 185/1.
18. Id. art. 185/2.
19. Id. art. 186.
105
Al Hajjaji
states "judges are independent, cannot be dismissed, are subject to no
other authority but the law, and are equal in rights and duties."
Even though the 2014 Constitution grants full independence to the
judicial body, in reality, this independence is not absolute. In developed
countries, independence is not absolute due to the typically enforced
principle of separation of powers. In such relations, each power plays
its role in the checks and balances to maintain the full independence
of each power. The MoJ plays the central role in choosing members
of the judiciary, their promotion, their accountability, as well as the
nomination of the chairpersons of the primary courts. These are
in effect the core of the ordinary judiciary. This role will be further
discussed in the next few sections. In reference to the nature of the MoJ,
the judiciary as an institution is autonomous, but not independent.
B. Judicial Independence on the Bench
The independence of judges on the bench entails four factors, which are
judicial non-transferability, judicial tenure, judicial immunity, and ju-
dicial review. Firstly, judges cannot be transferred to another position,
unless they themselves agree to the said transfer.2 0 Similarly, members
of the court (chief justice, associate justices, or the commissioners) can-
not be transferred from their offices. There are two exceptions to this
rule. Firstly, when a judge has spent the maximum period in a specific
district, which varies between three to five years. At this point, a judge
must be transferred to another district. This exception is only applied
to the ordinary judiciary, and recently to the administrative judiciary.
The SCC judges are not subject to this exception. 21 Article 67 of the JAL
states that "members of the judiciary and public prosecution, except
aids to the district attorney, are irremovable. Judges of the court of cas-
sation cannot be transferred to the courts of appeal or public prosecu-
tion unless with their consent."22
Secondly, members of the judiciary are tenured, as they cannot be
removed from office. This rule applies to all four judicial institutions.
Article 11 of the SCC maintains that members of the court cannot
20. The Supreme Constitutional Court Law 48/1979, art. 11.
21. Id. art. 24.
22. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 97.
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be removed from position. The age of retirement for judges, who are
members of the ordinary judiciary, is 70.23 This age has vacillated
between 60 and 70 several times. During this period, judges cannot be
removed from position, unless they voluntarily resign, or are dismissed
as a result of disciplinary action. The JAL manages the two ways in which
judges can be removed from office. The first process is impeachment.
The second is resignation, in which case the law provides for full
retirement benefits for life in the event they wish to terminate their
appointment as judges. Members of the Public Prosecution Bureau also
follow the same rules as ordinary judges.2 4 The only exception applies
to the position of "an aide to district attorney" Prosecutors of this rank
can be dismissed from office by a decision of the attorney general.
Thirdly, members of the judiciary, including the ordinary judiciary,
and the Court of Cassation enjoy immunity. Article 15 of the SCC law
extends the protection granted to members of the Court of Cassation
to members of the SCC. 25 In the case of committing a crime, judges
cannot be arrested or taken into custody unless a warrant has been
issued by the SJC. The SJC has the right to issue a warrant to arrest
any judge if members of the council ascertain any violation of criminal
law-with the exception of one case. Article 96 regulates that if a judge
is caught in the act of committing an illegal act or crime, there is no
need to wait for a warrant for his/her arrest.
After concluding the investigation, the SJC is the competent
authority to decide whether to keep the judge in custody or release him/
her on bail.26 In the event of the judge being taken into custody, he/she
is placed on mandatory leave during this period. If the SJC decides to
release the judge, he/she will serve a mandatory suspension until the
end of the investigation and trial. During such time, the judge cannot
execute his/her duties, despite receiving his/her salary regularly until
the end of the investigation period.27
Fourthly, judicial decisions are made without interference of any
23. Id. art. 69.
24. The 2014 Constitution, art. 189.
25. The Supreme Constitutional Court Law 48/1979, art. 24.
26. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 97.
27. Id.
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external authority.28 The authority of the MoJ in judicial decision is
indirect. The MoJ does not directly interfere with judges' decisions. The
MoJ's rights, duties, and methods of interference are discussed in detail
in the next section.
C. Judicial Independence: Judicial Administration
-' Judicial administration differs from the SCC, ordinary courts (includ-
ing the PPO), the State Council (administrative courts), and the APO.
1. The First Body is the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC)29
It is the competent judicial body that has the ultimate power over
constitutional disputes. However, litigants cannot resort directly to the
constitutional court. They must first get the approval of the regular or
administrative courts to resort to the supreme constitutional court.
The establishment of the SCC underwent two phases during Sadat's
era. The first was the legal articulation of the basis of the SCC, while
the second involved the establishment of the court. The actual process
of establishing the SCC, however, started after the first constitution in
1923. In 1924, the Felony Court of Alexandria was approached with a
request to rule on the unconstitutionality of Article 151 of the Criminal
Code. The court did not approve the request.3 0
The first time the Egyptian courts recognized the unconstitutionality
claim was in 1926.3 The courts did not declare the unconstitutionality
of the law; rather they maintained their right not to apply the law.
Banning Egyptian courts from handling the constitutionality of the
laws is based on many reasons. Firstly, even though the Egyptian civil
legal system is based on the French system, the application of the laws
turned into a monocracy. This was a system that excludes the King's
28. The 2014 Constitution, art. 184/2 states "interference in judicial affairs or in
proceedings is a crime to which no statute of limitations may be applied".
29. Tamir Moustafa, Law Versus the State: the Judicialization ofPolitics in Egypt, 28
L & Soc INQUIRY 886 (2003).
30. 'an al-Mahkamah, lamha tarikhayah' [Supreme Constitutional Court]
Egypt (2014), http://hccourt.gov.eg/Pages/About/history.aspx> last access
21/02/2017.
31. Id.
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acts, which include the constitutionality of the law, from the judicial
authority. Secondly, there was a lack of a legal foundation, which would
have been more realistic, for such authority from 1883 to 1971. There
was no legal foundation to grant courts the right to deal with the
constitutionality of law.32
The first time the constitutionality of the laws was legalized was in
1953. This took place right after the 1952 Coup. This legal endeavor
had initially failed because members of the army refused any judicial
supervision. The second legal attempt took place after the 1971
Constitution. This constitution included five new articles, numbered
174 to 178 that regulate the formulation of a specialized constitutional
court. Firstly, 1971 Constitution stated that the SCC is an independent
judicial body." Secondly, the constitution addressed the tackling
of constitutional questions. Article 175 of the 1971 Constitution-
amended in 2007-states that the SCC "has the exclusive competence
to control the constitutionality of laws and regulations and to interpret
the legislative texts in the manner prescribed by the law. The law shall
determine other competences of the court, and regulate the procedure
to be followed."
Finally, there is the time gap between the first articulation of the
SCC and the SCCL. It took eight years (from 1971 to 1979) to establish C
the court. One of the reasons for this was the fear of an independent
judiciary that would deal with the constitutionality of the law.36
Furthermore, there was a need, after the shift to a market-based
economy in Egypt, to have the SCC in order to oversee the legality of
the laws. There was a need to ensure the rule of law in the country to
attract foreign investment.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The 2014 Constitution, art. 174 states "The Supreme Constitutional Court shall
be an independent judicial body with a distinct legal nature in the Arab Repub-
lic of Egypt, and shall have its seat in Cairo'.
36. Tamir, supra note 29 at 886.
37. Id. at 889.
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The SCC is an independent judicial body." The 2014 Constitution
ensures the independence of its seat, budget and general assembly. The
SCC consists of three main bodies. The first is the Chief Justice of the
Court, who is the head of the court. He has many other constitutional
responsibilities, including the impeachment of justices. 9 In the case
of both the absence of a President of State and/or the disseverment of
parliament, the Chief Justice takes charge of the country until a new
9 President has been nominated. 40 The Chief Justice of the SCC Adly
2 Mansour replaced President Mohamed Morsi as interim President
after the Military Coup of July 2013.41 He ruled Egypt for nine months
until Field Marshal Abdel Fatah al-Sisi won the presidential elections
in March 2014.42
The second body is the People's Assembly, which is responsible
for the administrative affairs of the court. The People's Assembly is
"responsible for governing the Court's affairs, and is consulted during
law drafting of issues related to the Court's affairs."' The People's
Assembly also has additional functions. Article 144 of the Constitution
states "[i]n case of the absence of the House of Representatives, the
oath is to be taken before the General Assembly of the SCC."44 It is
O
U also the institute that oversees the acceptance of the resignation of the
President, in the event of the People's Assembly being dissolved.
o The third body is the commissioner authority, which consists of the
judges, advisors and assistant advisors.46 Members of the commission
38. The 2014 Constitution, art. 191 states "[t]he SCC is an independent judicial
body... [I] t has independent budget, the items of which are discussed by the
House of Representatives, after it is approved, it is incorporated in the state
budget as a single figure'
39. The 2014 Constitution, art. 159/3.
40. Id. art. 160/3.
7 41. Profile: Interim Egyptian President Adly Mansour, BBC (Jul. 4, 2013), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23176293 (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
42. Egypt Abdel Fattah al-Sisi Profile, BBC (May 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-19256730 (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
43. The 2014 Constitution, art. 191.
44. Id. art. 144.
45. Id. art. 158.
46. Id. art. 193/2.
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are ranked as chancellors. 7 Their role is to prepare the cases for the
SCC judges. They have the right to contact any governmental or non-
governmental entities within the country to request information
pertaining to certain cases.48 The Commissioner Authority plays the
role of the investigator in the case, in order to produce a report or
opinion to the court about the case in question. In this report, the
commission presents constitutional and legal issues and offers its
legal opinion.50 The court has jurisdiction over certain types of cases.
The Constitution lays down the general line of the jurisdiction of the
court, while the SCC law lays down the details. 1 In short, the SCC is
responsible for answering the following issues.
1. the judicial supervision of the constitutionality of the law and
regulations (Art. 25);52
2. the conflict of law and the conflict of jurisdiction among judicial
institutions (Art. 25);51
3. the conflict raised as a result of contradictory judgments L
between two different judicial institutions (Art. 25);54
4. the interpretation of the laws and regulations (Art. 26);55 and
47. The Supreme Constitutional Court Law 48/1979, art. 41.
48. Id. art. 39.
49. Id. art. 40.
50. Id.
51. The 2014 Constitution, art. 192 states "the court is: exclusively competent to
decide on the constitutionality of laws and regulations, interpret legislative
texts, and adjudicate in disputes pertaining to the affairs of its members, in
disputes between judicial bodies and entities that have judicial mandate, in
disputes pertaining to the implementation of two final contradictory rulings,
one of which is issued by any judicial body or an agency with judicial mandate
and the other issued by another body, and in disputes pertaining to the imple-
mentation of its rulings and decisions.'
52. The Supreme Constitutional Court Law 48/1979, art. 25.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 26.
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5. the unification of the interpretation of the laws (Art. 26).56
2. The Second Body is the Ordinary Judiciary, which is the Main Judicial
Body
It is the competent judiciary for all types of cases except two. Firstly,
administrative cases fall under the State Council jurisdiction.5 ' Article
15 of the Judicial Authority Law (hereinafter JAL) states that "except
administrative disputes, which the State Council is in charge of, courts
are competent of every type of disputes and crimes."5  Secondly,
constitutional disputes fall under the jurisdiction of the SCC.5 9
Moreover, the ordinary judiciary consists of the Public Prosecution
Office (hereinafter PPO) and three different types of courts, which are
the Court of Cassation, the Court of Appeal, and the Court of First
Instance (Primary Court and Partial Court).60
Firstly, the Court of Cassation is the highest court, and the only
one of its kind in the ordinary judiciary, as shown in Figure (2). It was
established in 1931 and is located in Cairo.6 1 It consists of four bodies.
The first is the Court of Cassation Public Assembly, which consists of
all the members of the court, including those of the Court of Chief
Justice, Associate Justices and Junior Justices. The work of the Court
of Cassation is based on the principle of seniority. The most senior
member takes charge of the court. The presidency term of the court
is just one judicial year, which starts in October and concludes at the
end of September the following year. The Court Chief Justice also
serves as president of the Supreme Judicial Council {hereinafter SJC}.
The second entity is made up of the Criminal Law General Committee
56. Id.
57. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 15.
58. Article 188 of the constitution states that " The judiciary adjudicates all disputes
and crimes except for matters over which another judicial body is competent.
Only the judiciary settles any disputes relating to the affairs of its members,
and its affairs are managed by a higher council whose structure and mandate
are organized by law."
59. The 2014 Constitution, art. 192.
60. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 1.
61. The 2014 Constitution, art. 2.
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and the Civil Law General Committee.6 2 Each Committee consists of
11 judges, chosen by members of the People's Assembly.63 The third
body is the court circuits, a total of 33 circuits, of which 16 deal with
criminal cases, and 17 with civil, commercial, family and labor cases.64
The fourth entity is the Court of Cassation Technical Office. This office
specializes in the administrative affairs of the court.65
The Court of Cassation is not a court of facts, but rather a court of
law. This means that parties cannot bring new additions to their cases.
The Court of Cassation only rules whether the lower Court of Appeal
has applied a correct understanding of the law.66 Additionally, the Court
of Cassation is responsible for determining general legal rules that are
followed in any given dispute. It offers a unified understanding of the
law, which all lower courts must follow. The process of developing
these rules is restricted. It goes through three main stages. Firstly, one
of the 33 circuits has to establish a new rule or overrule an existing
one. This circuit must then transfer its new rule to the competent
General Committee to determine the applicability of the new rule.
Seven members of the competent committee must agree on the new
rule to be able to proceed to the next step. Secondly, if seven members
of the competent committee accept the new or overruled ruling, the
new rule is then transferred to the two General Committees together
for approval. A majority of 14 out of 22 judges must agree to consider
a new legal rule. 67 Thirdly, the technical office of the court shall follow
a procedural rule. This office is responsible for publishing the new rule
to the general public.
Secondly, Egypt is home to eight Courts of Appeal.6 8 These are
located in Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta, Mansoura, Ismalia, Bani Swaif,
Assiut and Qena governorates.69 Previously, there were only six courts,
62. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 3.
63. Id. art. 4.
64. Id.
65. Id. art. 5.
66. The Court of Cassation (2013), http-//www.cc.gov.eg/index-4.html#.
67. Id.
68. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 10.
69. Id. art. 6.
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before those in Qena and Ismailia were introduced in 2006. The circuits
in the court of appeal consist of three judges."o All of them have the rank
of "Judge at the Court of Appeal'" The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
over civil and criminal cases. For civil law jurisdiction, it is restricted to
appeal cases that are worth more than 40 thousand Egyptian pounds.
These types of cases are under the jurisdiction of the primary court
(in the court of first instance jurisdiction)." As for the criminal law
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal is responsible for felony cases only.
C To this day, felony cases have no specialized appeal court. The current
form of appeal for felonies is to resort to the Court of Cassation, which
is a process that takes place over various stages. In the first stage, the
Court of Cassation, since it is a court of law, does not deal with the facts
of the case. If it finds a wrongful legal interpretation, it orders a retrial
at a different circuit of felony courts. In the second stage, the defendant
has the right to appeal the second felony court's judgment in front of
2 the Court of Cassation. In the second appeal, the Court of Cassation
.2 either sustains the second felony court judgment or rules in the case
by itself. In the latter case, the Court of Cassation acts as a court of
equity. It will hear all witnesses, excluding new evidence, and all factual
pleadings. As a result of this complicated process, many lawyers and
politicians request a legal amendment to include an appeal level for
felony courts. The 2014 Constitution has included an article that
±z mandates an appellate court for felony judgments.7 2 To date, however,
there is no regulation governing the appeal of felonies.
Thirdly, the Court of First Instance is divided into two different
3 courts namely the primary courts and the partial courts. Firstly, the
primary court is the upper court of the Court of First Instance. There is
one primary court in each governorate." It consists of several circuits.
Each is made up of three judges. In civil law cases, the primary court
has unique value jurisdiction. It is considered the court of first instance
7 for cases worth more than 40 thousand Egyptian pounds. However, it
is considered a court of appeal for cases worth less than 40 thousand
70. Id.
71. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 4.
72. Id. art. 96 states "the law shall regulate the appeal of felony sentences".
73. Id. art. 9.
74. Id. art. 7.
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pounds."5 In criminal law matters, the primary court is considered an
appeal court for misdemeanor cases. Secondly, the partial court is the
lower court within the Court of First Instance, with one in every district
in the governorate.7 6 The partial court consists of one judge. It has
jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters. For civil law jurisdiction, it
has non-appealable jurisdiction over civil cases that are worth less than
five thousand pounds. In cases worth less than 40 thousand pounds
and more than five thousand pounds, the partial court acts as a court
of first instance.77 As for criminal law jurisdiction, it is restricted to
misdemeanor cases only, which are crimes that are punishable by a
sentence of fewer than three years. 8
Fourthly, the Public Prosecution Office (hereinafter PPO) is
considered an integral part of the regular judiciary. Contrary to
widespread understanding, the role of the prosecution is considered
part of the executive authority.79 The Egyptian PPO, during the
Republic Era, underwent three stages of developments that eventually
led to giving prosecution a judicial characteristic, which is the
status of the prosecution. In the first stage, the PPO was a member
of the executive authority (1951-1952).so Judges were responsible for
investigations, while the public prosecutors' work was limited to the
prosecution of cases. In the second stage, the PPO enjoyed a mixed
role, both executive and judicial, as a result of the Criminal Procedures
Law amendment in 1952. This amendment gave the PPO the power
and privileges of an investigative judge. Article 199 of the Criminal
Procedures Law gave prosecutors the right to investigate any case. Even
though the prosecution enjoyed the privileges of an investigative judge,
the nature of the prosecution was still unclear, whether it was executive
or judicial. The Court of Cassation dealt with this question in 1961. It
emphasized the mixed nature of the public prosecution. The judicial
75. Civil and Commercial Procedures Law no. 13/1968, art. 42.
76. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 13.
77. Civil, supra note 75.
78. Criminal Law no.58 /1937, art. 11.
79. Stephanie Dangel, Is prosecution a core Executive Function? Morrison v. Ol-
son and the Framers' Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069-70 (1990). See also, Saikrishna
Prakash, Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 521-89 (2004-05).
80. Criminal Procedure Code no 50/1950.
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nature of the prosecution consisted in it performing the role of an
investigative judge, while its executive nature involved all the other tasks
of the prosecution." In the third stage, the prosecution was considered
a purely judicial authority. After a long debate over the nature of the
prosecution, Article 189 of the 2014 Constitution considered the PPO
members an integral part of the judiciary.82
Part of the judicial nature of the PPO is the judicial nature of
-C' the position of the Attorney General, which is not yet reflected in
the present JAL. Before 2014, the President of the Republic had the
ultimate authority to appoint the Attorney General." However, the
2014 Constitution transferred this authority over to the SJC." After
the assassination of the Attorney General Hesham Barakat in 2015,8'
the appointment of a new Attorney General was put on hold for more
than six months. 6 The reason for the delay was that the President
wanted to appoint the new Attorney General, while the SJC upheld its
constitutional right to do so itself." Following this struggle, the SJC
successfully appointed the new Attorney General Nabil Sadek. As
for the judicial oath, it must still be taken before the President of the
3 81. Court of Cassation, Case no. 1551, Judicial Year 30.
C 82. The 2014 Constitution, art. 189 states "the public prosecution is an integral
part of the judiciary. It is responsible for investigating, law exempts pressing
charges and prosecuting all criminal cases except what. The law establishes the
public prosecution's other competencies".
83. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, arts 44 and 119.
84. The 2014 Constitution, art. 189/2 states "public prosecution is carried out by
a Prosecutor General who is selected by the Supreme Judicial Council from
among the Deputies to the President of the Court of Cassation, the Presidents
of the Court of Appeals or the Assistant Prosecutor Generals, by virtue of a
presidential decree for a period of four years, or for the period remaining until
retirement age, whichever comes first, and only once during a judge's career".
85. Egypt Prosecutor Hisham Barakat Killed in Cairo Attack, BBC NEWS (Jun. 29,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33308518 (last visited-
Feb. 21, 2017).
86. Mariam Jabal, Khlaf Dostori Yoajal Iktiar al-Na'b al-Am', ALBAWABA NEWS
(Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.albawabhnews.com/1493128 (last visited Feb. 21,
2017).
87. The 2014 Constitution, art. 189/ 2.
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Republic."*
3. The Third Body is the Administrative Court, which is Represented in
the State Council
From 1949 to 1984, administrative courts were part of the executive
authority. The first law on the State Council was law number 9 for
the year 1949. Article 1 stated that the State Council was an institute
affiliated to the Ministry of Justice."9 After the 1952 Military Coup, the
army issued a new law that made the State Council an independent
body under Cabinet supervision.90 In 1972, the new State Council law
transferred the supervision from the Cabinet back to the Ministry of
Justice. In August 1984, the law was amended to give the State Council
full independence from the executive authority. The current formulation
of Article 1 of the State Council law states: "the State Council is an
independent judicial authority" 9 ' The 2014 Constitution and the State 0
Council law thus give the administrative courts exclusive jurisdiction
over administrative disputes.9 2
The State Council consists of three different branches. These
branches are the judicial, legislative and advisory bodies. Firstly, the
judicial branch has exclusive authority over administrative disputes.
It consists of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Administrative 3
Courts, the Disciplinary Courts, and the State Commission Board.9  2
Additionally, the State Council Law excludes some administrative
88. Nabil Sadek, Sworn In by Sisi as Egypt's New Prosecutor General, AHRAM ON-
LINE, (Sept. 19, 2015), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/141872/
Egypt/0/Nabil-Sadek-sworn-in-by-Sisi-as-Egypts-new-prosecu.aspx (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2017).
89. The State Council Law no 9/1949, art. 1.
90. The State Council Law no 165/1955, art. 1.
91. The State Council Law no 47/1972, art. 1.
92. The 2014 Constitution, art. 190 states "State Council is exclusively competent
to adjudicate in administrative disputes, disciplinary cases and appeals, and
disputes pertaining to its decisions. It is solely competent to issue opinions on
the legal issues of bodies to be determined by law. It reviews and drafts bills and
resolutions of a legislative character, and reviews draft contracts, to which the
state or any public entity is a party. Other competencies are to be determined
by law".
93. The State Council Law no 47/1972, art. 3.
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disputes from its jurisdiction, like acts of sovereignty.94 Secondly, the
legislative branch is the competent authority for revising and passing
any proposed law, regulation, or legal amendment that the government
(either the President or the Cabinet) wishes to issue. It prepares and
submits any new legal text upon request by the government.95 The
president of the legislative branch is also the Chief Justice of the State
Council. 9 6 Thirdly, the advisory branch is the competent body for
g providing legal advice to the President, the Cabinet, ministers and
2 public institutions.97
Moreover, any governmental agency has to seek the acceptance of
the advisory branch of the State Council, in case of taking on, accepting,
or validating any contract, reconciliation, or arbitration award.98 To
avoid any hassle from the government with the State Council advisory,
the law gives the government the right to hire an advisory branch of the
State Council to work as legal advisors to the President, the Cabinet,
ministers and public institutions."
4. The Administrative Prosecution Office (hereinafter APO) was Estab-
lished in September 1954
0
a9 The explanatory memorandum of the APO lists the reasons
8 necessitating the establishment of the APO. Firstly, the APO aims to
face all forms of interference in the administrative investigation against
senior public officials."oo Secondly, the APO is a replacement of several
legal departments that are established in each governmental agency or
ministry. It is the sole body responsible for investigating violations by
governmental officials. Thirdly, the APO is responsible for providing
technical and legal training and education to its members. The agency
ensures that all its members obtain the necessary and required training
94. Id. art. 11.
95. Id. art. 59/1.
96. Id. art. 70.
97. Id. art. 63.
98. Id. art. 58/3.
99. Id. art. 59/1.
100. The Administrative Prosecution Office Establishment Law no 480/1954, ex-
planatory memorandum.
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and education. Previously, each legal department was responsible for
providing the required legal training to its members. o
The development of the APO has undergone three stages. The first
took place between the years 1954 and 1958 when the APO was still an
affiliate body of the Cabinet.102 The second stage unfolded from 1954
to 2014, a period during which the APO was under the supervision of
the Ministry of Justice."o3 In the third stage, from 2012 onwards, APO
members started to lobby for their independence from the executive
authority. They sought to eliminate any interference by the Ministry
of Justice. The APO finally achieved independence. 104 It was also given
exclusive authority over "financial and administrative irregularities.
Regarding these irregularities, it has the authorities vested in the
administration body to inflict disciplinary penalties ... it also initiated
and conducted proceedings and disciplinary appeals before the State
Council courts in accordance with the law.'1 oa
D. Judicial Institution Independence: Case Assignment
A) The SCC Grants Certiorari in Two Cases
Firstly, any court or tribunal can transfer a case to the SCC to answer
a matter regarding the constitutionality of a law. This right is granted
to ordinary courts, the State Council or arbitrary tribunal. If the court
identifies a likelihood of unconstitutionality of a certain law, the issue
is then referred to the SCC. 106 Secondly, parties can request a transfer of
the case directly to the SCC. The party claiming the unconstitutionality
of the law is able to request a transfer of the claim to the SCC. The
SCC deals only with cases of constitutionality, without touching on
any of the dispute questions. The second case is not unfailingly right.
The competent court must recognize the validity of the party claim.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The Administrative Prosecution Office Establishment Law no 1985, art. 1.
104. The 2014 Constitution, art. 197/1 states "the Administrative Prosecution is an
independent judicial body".
105. Id. art. 197/2.
106. The Supreme Constitutional Court Law 48/1979, art. 29/1.
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The court must first acknowledge the base for the unconstitutional
defense.1 0 7 When the case is transferred to the SCC, the SCC's Public
Assembly is responsible for assigning the case to the court. However, the
court depends on the motions and memos submitted by both parties. 08
2. Ordinary and administrative courts have different rules regarding case
assignment based on the court type and level.
Generally, there are four types of case assignment, which are adopted
in the justice administration system.
Firstly, both the MoJ and the president of the court enjoy great
discretion in assigning certain types of cases to certain courts, or
certain circuits. In 2008, the MoJ introduced the new economic courts
in Egypt. 09 The definition of these economic courts was left to the MoJ
to determine. This definition opens the door to include several laws
that are not related to each other like the IP laws, electricity laws, and
consumer protection laws.o Moreover, presidents of the courts have
the ultimate right to assign cases to certain judges.' This can happen
either through assigning certain type of cases to certain circuit or
a directly assign a certain case to a certain judge.1 1 2
Secondly, case assignment is based on jurisdiction. In this type of case
assignment, each case has monetary, spatial, or personal jurisdictions.
Each court has its monetary jurisdiction limit. This is common in civil
or commercial cases. For instance, the monetary limit of partial courts
is less than 10,000 Egyptian Pounds, while that of the primary court is
greater than 10,000 Egyptian Pounds. As for special jurisdiction, each
court specializes in cases that take place within its domain. There is
only one exception to this rule, which is the necessity to transfer the
107. Id. art. 29/2.
7 108. Id. art. 44.
109. Mohamed Ghanem, Reasons for Establishing the Economic Courts in Egypt, 3
MACRO-THEME REV. 167, 174 (2014).
110. Legal Research Guide: Egypt, LIBRARY OF THE CONGRESS (Sept. 06, 2015),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-research-guide/egypt.php>1ast access
21/2/2017.
111. Id.
112. Id.
120
Al Hajjaji
trial from one district to another."' The competent judge is responsible
for determining such a necessity. As for personal jurisdiction, this is
related to the age of the defendant, like minors and adults.
Thirdly, case assignment is based on the case type and a court's
area of specialization. The case type is a debatable issue in the Egyptian
judiciary, especially in the lower courts. This debate is related to
the unclear rules regarding the specialization of judges in the lower
courts."' In theory, Article 12 of the JAL grants the judge the right to
ask for specialization after four years of his nomination." In practice,
however, this is not the case. For instance, most of the courts of first
instance judges are assigned to both civil and criminal circuits, in
addition to labor and criminal circuits.
Moreover, the MoJ has full authority to set the rules regarding
judges' specializations, an occurrence that is rarely practiced. It is in the
MoJ's best interest to maintain the status quo in order to maintain its
influence over the judges. The MoJ wants to ensure that judges comply
with the MoJ's rules. The MoJ, through the chairperson of the court,
assigns certain judges, who are well known to have a certain inclination
in certain cases, to certain types of cases. The reason for doing this is to
apply pressure on the loyalty of the judges to their chairperson, to either
transfer them to better districts or assign them to their specialized areas
of law.
Furthermore, the limited number of judges compared to the
number of cases limits the scope of specialization. Many judges have
thousands of cases to review each month.1 1 6 They are expected to finish w
about 300 cases a day. Usually, the average caseload in a misdemeanor
court ranges from 150 to 250 a day. In the felony court, the average is
around 25-40 cases."' As for the PPO, prosecutors in Egypt deal with
113. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 11.
114. The Egyptian Legal System, GLOBAL ETHICS OBSERVATORY, LEGISLATION AND
GUIDELINES, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/shs/ethics/geo/user/?action=-
Geo4Country&db=GEO4&id=9&1ng=en.
115. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 93.
116. Mohamed Gahem, The Negative Consequence of the Phenomenon of Slow
Pace of Litigation in Egypt: Economic and Commercial Issues, (Nov. 7-8, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=245609 1.
117. Id.
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all types of cases. This is due to two reasons. One is the limited number
of prosecutors compared to the number of cases. In districts like Santa
Clara, California, there are about 45,000 cases a year. There are also
about 188 prosecutors and more than 500 employees within the same
district.' A district like Embaba, Giza, has about 50,000 cases a year,
with about 12 prosecutors and 35 employees. Two is the lack of the
specialized training and education on both the university level and
- judicial level. The result is therefore slow justice, more so given the lack
of specialized judges.1 1 9
Fourthly, cases are assigned based on case numbers. Each case has a
judicial number. Each judge or circuit is assigned to a certain number.
Usually, this type of case assignment is limited to the lower courts.
For example, if there are five judges working in criminal cases in a
certain district, each judge will be assigned two "judicial numbers." The
distribution of cases is as follows: Judge 1, the most senior judge, takes
cases ending with judicial numbers 0 and 1. Judge 2, the second most
senior, takes cases ending with judicial numbers 2 and 3, Judge 3 takes
cases ending with judicial numbers 4 and 5, Judge 4 takes cases ending
with judicial numbers 6 and 7, and Judge 5, the junior of them all, takes
O
u cases ending with judicial numbers 8 and 9. This way of distributing
cases has evolved into a tradition in the judiciary work of the courts.
Each year, the People's Assembly distributes the numbers based on the
seniority of the members of the office.
E. The Judicial Institution Independence: Remuneration and
Resources
1. The SCC has a Fully Independent Budget'20
It guards its budget against interference from either the executive
authority or any other judicial body. Article 12 states the rules that
118. Frequently Asked Questions, OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, COUNTY OF
SANTA CLARA (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.sccgov.org/sites/da/aboutus/Pages/
faq.aspx.
119. Gahem, supra note 106.
120. The Supreme Constitutional Court Law 48/1979, art. 8.
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determine the salaries of members of the judiciary. 121 The SCC law
establishes an independent body attached to the SCC responsible for
ensuring the SCC's financial independence. This body is responsible
for maintaining the necessary fund for salaries, health insurance, and
social activities of the members of the court and its commissioners. 122
Moreover, the 2014 Constitution ensures a non-transparent policy
with regard to the SCC budget. The policy maintains that the budget of
the judicial institutions should not be announced to the public. Article
191 states that the SCC "has an independent budget whose items are
all discussed by the House of Representatives. After it is approved, it is
incorporated in the state budget as a single figure." 1 23
2. The 2014 Constitution Maintains the Independence of the Budget of
the Ordinary Courts, the State Council, the APO and the PPO
Each type of court or office has its own budget. The Supreme Council 04
of each is responsible for allocating the required funds and supervising R
expenditure. The only exception to this rule is in the ordinary judiciary.
The PPO in each partial, primary or appeal court is responsible for
supervising all financial issues of the court. Article 28 of the JAL states
that the PPO takes over the supervision of the issue related to court 8
expenditure.124 The revenue for the courts comes from fines, fees, and c
bails, which are also handled by the PPO. 125
Article 68 of the JAL regulates the salaries of prosecutors, judges
and chancellors. It states that their salaries are in accordance with the
table attached to the law. As for the SCC, it enjoys full independence
over any dispute regarding the salaries of court members. 12 6 It has the
right to determine the compensation and the salaries of its members
121. Id. art. 12.
122. Id. art. 18.
123. The 2014 Constitution, art. 191. This rule applied to the whole judicial bodies
including the ordinary courts, the state council, PPO, and APO".
124. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 28.
125. Id. art. 29 states fines and other types of fees required in criminal, civil, or per-
sonal status (family law), as well as deposits and safe-boxes shall be collected,
saved and spent by court employees under direct supervision of both the Pub-
lic Prosecution Bureau and the Minister of Justice'.
126. The Supreme Constitutional Court Law 48/1979, art. 16.
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based on the table of salaries attached to the law.
No judge can receive any salary on a personal or exceptional basis.127
Since the age of retirement has been fixed at 70 years,128 judges receive
monetary compensation from their retirement plan at the age of 60.
The ten years between the ages of 60 to 70 are not part of the retirement
plan. The reason is that the age of 70 was never the age of retirement
for judges. It increased from 60 to 65, then from 65 to 67, and finally
-C* from 67 to 70. The government wanted to increase the age for political
reasons, without adding any financial burdens.129
III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN
EGYPT
A. The Role of the MoJ
The nature of the position of MoJ is rather vague and unclear. It is not
known whether he is an executive or a judicial authority.130 The MoJ is
a member of the Cabinet. However, precedents in appointing the MoJ
85 indicate that he has to be a former judge from the ordinary judiciary.'
2 This is due to the lack of a serious separation of powers. In addition, all
2 the senior officers and employees in the Ministry of Justice are judges,
on either full or partial secondment to the Ministry. In the past ten
years, six justices have assumed the position of MoJ.132 Three out of six
o were members of the Court of Cassation, while the other three were
members of the Cairo Court of Appeal. The judges who were members
127. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 68.
128. Id. art. 69.
129. Nora Elbialy & Miguel A. Garcia- Rubio, Assessing Judicial Efficiency of Egyp-
tian First Instance Courts A DEA Analysis, https://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/
makro/forschung/magkspapers/19-201 1elbialy.pdf.
130. Adel Ramadan, Who Enforces Egypt's Laws?, THE TAHRIR INSTITUTE FOR MID-
DLE EAST POL'Y (Jun. 5, 2016), https://timep.org/tjp-analysis/who-enforces-
egypts-laws/.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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of the Court of Cassation are Neir Osman (the ex-vice president of the
Court of Cassation, February 2014 - present), Adel Abdel Hamid (ex-
president of the Court of Cassation, July 2013 - February 2014 and
December 2011 - August 2012), and Ahmed Mikky (ex-vice president
of the Court of Cassation, August 2012 - May 2013).
The judicial nature of the MoJ allows interference in judicial affairs,
especially judicial administration. This is clear in the role the MoJ
plays in administrating and supervising courts and judges."3 In theory,
the JAL recognizes three sources of court administration: the MoJ,
the court chairperson, and the court public assembly.1 14 In practice,
the MoJ is granted-ultimately-two-thirds of the administration of
the court in Egypt. The first third is due to the role of the MoJ as the
court administrator. The second third is associated with his right to
nominate the chairperson of the primary courts. Article 9 of the JAL S
states that the MoJ has the right to nominate the chairperson of the 2
primary courts, with the approval of the SJC, for a renewable term of E
one year. " The court chairperson has full authority to administer both R
the judicial and administrative affairs of the court. The authority of
the court chairperson to administer the court's judicial affairs comes
from the delegation of power from the court public assembly, as will 8
be shown in the next paragraph. As for the administrative power, the
court chairperson derives his power from the power of the MoJ, who
appoints him in the first place.136
133. The Judicial Authority Law 46/1972, art. 93/1 states "the MoJ has the right to O
administrative supervision over the courts, and the president of each court and
its public assembly has the right to supervision.
134. Id. art. 93/2 grants the MoJ and the president of the court, who is appointed by
the MoJ, the right to supervise courts and judges. The president of each court
and its public assembly had the right to supervise the judges of such court. This
article was amended in 2006, with the new amendment eliminating the au-
thority of the Ministry of Justice over judicial supervision, while maintaining
its direct supervision over the administration of the court.
135. Id. art. 9 states "Each (primary) court is made up of an adequate number of
judges and chancellors. A judge from the appeal court is nominated to be its
presidency... The Minister of Justice issues the nomination decree after the
acceptance of the SJC of such nomination. The duration of the nomination is
for a renewable period of one year".
136. Id.
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The final third is assigned to the public assembly of the court,
which usually delegates its power to the chairperson of the court, who
is appointed by the MoJ. Each court's public assembly has to delegate its
power to the chairperson of the court. This is due to the impossibility
to make the public assembly convene to discuss administrative and
judicial court issues. Each court consists of junior and senior judges.
While junior judges work three days a week (either Saturday to Monday,
or Tuesday to Thursday), senior judges work only one week a month.
It is rather hard to coordinate their schedules, unless for exceptionally
urgent matters. As a result, a court tradition has evolved that sees the
public assembly gather only once at the beginning of the judicial year. In
their first meeting, assemblies delegate their power to the chairperson
of the court. This delegation occurs on the first day of each new judicial
year, starting in October.
2 B. The Role of Judicial Organization in Sustaining Judicial
Autonomy
There are three forms of organizations in the judiciary: formal, semi-
formal, and informal. Firstly, the SJC is the only formal organization in
the ordinary judiciary. The process of formulating the SJC underwent
several stages until it reached its current status. The first stage occurred
in 1943. The Independent Judiciary Law (hereinafter IJL) assigned the
SJC to handle judicial issues such as judicial appointments, transfers,
and public judicial issues."' The SJC consists of eight members: the
president of the Court of Cassation, the representative of the MoJ, the
president of the Cairo Court of Appeal, the Attorney General, an elected
member from the public assembly of the Court of Cassation, elected
members from the public assembly of the Cairo Court of Appeal, as
well as the president of the Cairo Primary Court.
The second stage occurred after the amendment of the IJL in 1952,
upon the success of the Military Coup.140 The amended Article 34
137. Id. art. 14.
138. Id. art. 36.
139. Id. art. 34.
140. Shalakany, supra note 8, at 278.
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abolished any form of election in the formulation of SJC.14 ' The elected
members were replaced with appointed members. Instead of electing
two members-one member from the public assembly of the Court
of Cassation and one member from the public assembly of the Cairo
Court of Appeal-the two elected members were the president of the
Alexandria Court of Appeal and the first vice president of the Court
of Cassation. 142 In 1956, a new amendment of the SJC was introduced
to reflect the unification between Egypt and Syria. The new SJC
formulation doubled its membership to include both Egyptian and
Syrian judges. 143After the dissolution of the union, a new law was issued
in 1965. It returned the formulation of the council to its old form. This
form continued to be in force until 1969.
The third stage occurred in 1969. President Nasser unified the
SJC with the State Council board. This new Council was the Supreme
Council for Judicial Institutes (hereinafter SCJI). The main role of the
SCJI was to supervise both the ordinary and administrative judiciary.
The aim of the new council was the cooperation between the judicial
institutions, to advise judicial institutes, and to propose judicial
legislation to reform the judiciary. The SCJI included members from
the ordinary judiciary, the State Council, the PPO, the APO and the
State Case Authority. Even though the administrative judiciary was
under Cabinet supervision, the ordinary judiciary was an independent
entity. As a result, this new formulation meant compromising judicial
independence through the introduction of dependent institutions to
the independent judiciary.
The last-and current-stage started in 2008. A new amendment
was introduced to the JAL to replace the SCJI with the SJC. The current
formulation of the SJC is similar to that after the 1952 Coup. It consists
of seven members, who represent the various entities inside the regular
judiciary. They are the president of the Court of Cassation, the first
vice president of the Court of Cassation, the Cairo Court of Appeal
president, the Alexandria Court of Appeal president, the Mansoura
Court of Appeal president (instead of the representative of the MoJ), as
141. Id.
142. The Judicial Authority Law 188/1952, art. 34.
143. Id. art. 82.
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well as the Attorney General."'
Secondly, the Judges' Club (hereinafter Club), established in 1939,
is the only semi-formal organization within the judiciary. Its semi-
formal nature is due to two reasons. Firstly, there is no formal judicial
assignment or law that underpins the Club. Secondly, the Club includes
all members of the judiciary, both judges and prosecutors.
Additionally, the Club's nature is controversial, since it incorporates
legal, social, and political aspects. In legal terms, the Club has no
special law, nor is it mentioned in the JAL. The Club was established
as a non-governmental organization. It has its own bylaws, which were
negotiated and set by judges and prosecutors. They include the rules of
election to the Club board, as well as administrative and financial issues.
The Club's principal focus is its social aspect. The main club is located
in Cairo, with several other clubs located in various governorates. The
administration of these clubs is non-centralized, as each of them has its
own board. Any judge or prosecutor can be a member of one or more of
these clubs. As for its political role, the Club has on numerous occasions
interfered in politics. 1 This role, however, is exceptional. The JAL bans
judges and courts from pursuing any form of political involvement.146
In the past decade, this type of interference has occurred twice.147 The
first time was after the election fraud in 2005, while the second time
was during the period of rule of the Muslim Brotherhood {hereinafter
MB}.
Thirdly, the Egyptian judiciary-in its contemporary history-
identifies three informal organizations. They are the Secret Organization
Tanziem Sarie al-Tali'I (hereinafter Tanziem), the Independent Judicial
Movement Qoda' al-Istqlal (hereinafter IJM), and the Judges for Egypt,
2 known as Qoda' men-ajl-Misr (hereinafter JFE). The informal nature of
j these organizations is also based on two reasons. Firstly, theyhaveno legal
8 status, and secondly, not all judges are members of such organizations.
7 The first organization was established during the period of President
144. Id. art. 77 bis 1.
145. Atef Shahat Said, The Role of Judge's Club in Enhancing the Independence of the
Judiciary and Spurring Political Reform, in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN
EGYPT 115 (Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron ed., 2008).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Nasser. It included several judges, who held leading positions within
the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecution Office. For example,
Judge Ali Nour Al-Din was appointed as the Attorney General."' Judge
Sadak al-Mahdi was appointed as Vice Minister of Justice. 1 4 9 President
Sadat dissolved the Tanziem. Due to its secretive nature, there is a lack
of official data regarding its current status.
The second informal organization is the JIM, which was established
after the judicial massacre in 1969. From 1970 through to 2010, many
judges formed the JIM. They organized secret meetings to support
their goal of judicial reform. The leading figures of this movement were
El Gheriani,so Mikky,"' and Genenia. 15 2 They were, however, unable to
enforce any judicial reform and blacklisted by the government. After
the January 25 Revolution, many of the IJM members were appointed
to high-ranking judicial and political positions, as a symbol of the
political will to reform the judiciary.
The third informal organization is the JFE. This organization was
established after the January 25 Revolution. There are allegations that
the JFE is connected to the MB. Waled Sharabi, one of the group's
leaders, was photographed leaving the MB headquarters. After ousting
ex-President Mohamed Morsi, Waled Sharabi was impeached. The 3
JFE furthermore condemned the 2013 Military Coup in a written
statement. This statement was read out in public in Rab'a Square. As a 2
result, members of the group were either impeached or are still awaiting
impeachment proceedings.
C. Inappropriate Interference in the Judiciary
The improper influence on judicial decision-making takes-in the
majority of cases-two forms. Firstly, the MoJ has the power to appoint
148. Ayman Gazi, al-mustashar Rafeat al-Said: Haikal sa'ad Abdel Nasser fi-mazba-
hat al-qodah, ROSE AL-YUlSUF NEWSPAPER (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.mas-
ress.com/rosadaily/58440.
149. Id.
150. Gheriani headed the Supreme Judicial Council from June 2011 to July 2012.
He was appointed as the President of the Constitute Assembly 2012.
151. Previous Minister of Justice in the Muslim Brotherhood Government 2012
152. President of Central Auditing Organization 2012 till present
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the president of the primary courts. This right of the MoJ is a legal
right. However, this right has been commonly and continuously
misused. The MoJ has the upper hand in choosing the president of the
primary courts, who has the right to assign judges to certain circuits.
Each court has circuits that specialize in certain types of cases, such as
high-profile commercial cases or cases of a political nature. Some cases
are also deemed sensitive, due to the parties involved.
The sensitive circuits are assigned to certain judges whose tendencies
in certain types of cases are known.' In 2012, Judge Mahmoud Shokri
was the judge assigned to the "illegal foreign fund against NGOs" case.
He was forced to resign from the case because he refused to comply
with the request of the president of the Cairo Court of Appeal, Judge
Abdel Moez Ibrahim, to release the defendant on bail.' The case was
assigned to another judge from the technical office of the court. As a
consequence, some judges brought a motion to sack Ibrahim, but they
were not successful. 155
Secondly, the MoJ has the ultimate power over the Judicial Inspection
Department (hereinafter JID). This is also a legal right.1 5 6 The 2014
Constitution gives the judiciary the right to regulate the accountability
rules of its members. 157 The problem with the JID and the MoJ lie in the
arbitrary nature of its decisions. This arbitrariness became clear after
2 the 2013 Military Coup. Many judges supported the coup, while others
supported ex-President Mohamed Morsi. Even though both groups
violated the JAL rules regarding the ban on political participation by
the judges, the JID impeached only judges who supported ex-President
153. Yussef Auf, Challenges Facing Egypt's Judiciary, Middle East Institute (May 1,
2013), http://www.mideasti.org/content/challenges-facing-egypts-judiciary.
154. Al-Mostashar Mahmoud Shokri Yabki 'al hal alqodah ma' Mahmoud Said, You-
TUBE (Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZOvMXkB44 (last
visited Feb. 21, 2017).
155. Mai Shams al-Din,Appeals Court Judges move to sack Abdel Moez Ibrahim, DAI-
LY NEWS EGYPT (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/03/23/
appeals-court-judges-move-to-sack-abdel-moez-ibrahim/.
156. There were some endeavors to transfer the inspection department from the
ministry of justice to the SJC during Chancellor Ahmed Mikky period as min-
ister of justice.
157. The 2014 Constitution, art. 84.
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Mohamed Morsi."
The problem of the improper influence on the judiciary is based on
a lack of comprehensive understanding of the principle of separation
of powers. The successive Egyptian constitutions have not mentioned
the principle of separation of powers explicitly."' It was the rule of
the judiciary that set the boundaries between the state authorities.
The Supreme Administrative Court based the principle of separation
of powers on Article 23 of the 1923 Constitution.160 Nonetheless, the
court's understanding of separation of powers is always based on
the separation between the judiciary and executive powers only, for
three reasons. Firstly, Article 24 of the 1923 Constitution delegates
the legislative authority to the King in collaboration with both
parliaments.16 1 Secondly, Article 29 delegates the head of the executive
authority to the King.16 2 Thirdly, Article 30 delegates the judicial
authority to the courts.163 Hence, the separation designated at the time
by the Supreme Administrative Court was the separation between the
King and the Courts.
In past decades, the separation of powers has also meant the
separation between the executive and the judicial powers. The
legislative authority was always representative of the government. Since 3
2005, four successive Parliaments have been sworn in as legislative c
bodies. They represent the conflict between the military and Islamist 2
figures. The first one was in effect between 2005 and 2010. The National
Democratic Party {hereinafter NDP}, which was the President's party,
won the election with an 82% majority.16 4 The MB came in second
158. Egypt refers 60 pro-brotherhood judges to disciplinary board, AHRAM ONLINE
(Oct. 20, 2014), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/113517/
Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-refers--proBrotherhood-judges-to-disciplinar.aspx.
159. Sahar Aziz, Independence without Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of
Egypt's Failed Transition to Democracy, 120 PENN ST. L. REv. 667, 670 (2015-
16).
160. The 1923 Constitution, art. 23. It states "people are the source of all authorities,
and the execution of authorities shall follow the rule of constitution".
161. Id. art. 24.
162. Id. art. 29.
163. Id. art. 30.
164. Yoram Meital, The Struggle over Political Order in Egypt: The 2005 Election, 60
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place, winning 76 seats out of 454.165 The new Al-Wafd Party came in
third with a total number of 6 seats. 166 The second election took place in
November 2010. The NDP won more than 95% of the total seats. There
were several allegations of election fraud from all the political parties
against the NDP. 1 67 This parliament was very short-lived, as it was
dissolved in 2011. The third election occurred in 2012 and dominated
by the Islamists. The MB managed to win more than 45% of the total
seats in the parliament, while the remaining Islamic parties won the
majority with 30% of total seats. 168 The fourth election was held in 2015.
The number of military generals in the current parliament is 71.169
D. Proposed Reform to Judicial Independence in Egypt
There are three proposed amendments to the current judicial
independence. Firstly, the power of the MoJ to appoint chairpersons
of the primary courts should be suspended. This authority gives the
C MoJ the ability to interfere in the outcomes of certain cases through
assigning them to certain judges. Instead, the public assembly of each
sD primary court should decide the choice of chairperson. Members of the
0 People's Assembly of the primary court should be able to choose their
chairperson through general elections. The election should furthermore
be discreet to respect the conservative nature of the judiciary and to
avoid the disadvantage of the electoral system in the United States.
Discreet elections mean that candidates are not allowed to advertise
their campaigns; instead, candidates rely only on their presentation
MIDDLE EAST J. 257, 257 (2006).
165. Sharon Otterman, Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Parliamentary Elections,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec. 01, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/egypt/
muslim-brotherhood-egypts-parliamentary-elections/p9319.
166. Wafed Party, EGYPTIAN ELECTIONS WATCH, AHRAMONLINE (Nov. 18, 2011),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/104/24940/Elections-/Politi-
cal-Parties/Wafd-partyaspx.
167. Id.
168. Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, BBC NEWS (Dec. 25, 2013), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east- 12313405.
169. Belasma' ta'araf 'al 71 lawa jaysh we-mokhabarat fi albarlaman al-'skari, na-
fazat Parlaman, EGYPT WINDOW (Dec. 5, 2015), http://old.egyptwindow.net/
newsDetails.aspx?NewsID=90772.
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to the public assembly of their qualifications. As a result, the People's
Assembly would vote for a candidate standing for the position of
chairperson of the primary court
Secondly, it has been argued that the authority of the MoJ should
be transferred to the SJC. However, this proposal increases the judicial
autonomy. This proposal implies a transfer of the authority of the MoJ
from one judge (MoJ) to seven judges (SJC). Any transfer of authorities
to the SJC should be done only after its reformulation. The current
formulation is prejudiced against a fair representation of all members
of the judiciary or judicial ranks, and public representation. A full
public representation in the judiciary involves two steps, interim and
permanent reforms.
The interim reform can be between five to ten years. It aims to pave s
the road for full public participation in judicial administration. During S
this period, not only should the SJC include elected members from the
judiciary, as was the case before 1952, but the new formulation should
also include senior law professors, who represent the conscience of
the public as an interim period. The proposed temporary formulation
is as follows: three representatives from the primary courts, three V
representatives from the courts of appeal, three representatives from
the court of cassation, two representatives from the junior prosecution
representatives, two representatives from the senior prosecution
representatives (including the Attorney General) and five senior law
professors chosen from the oldest four law schools (Cairo, Alexandria,
Assiut, Ain Shams).
The permanent reform would occur at a later period, once both
the judiciary and the public have accepted the idea of lay people,
lawyers and professors in the judicial administration. The formulation
of the SJC-during this period-will include elected judges, lawyers,
prominent public figures and emeritus professors. The manner and
method of choosing them shall be tackled in separate research dealing
with a later period of Egyptian judicial history.
Thirdly, there must be a clear ban on intervention by the Attorney
General from the interference in judicial investigations. In dependent
prosecutions, interference by the Attorney General or his assistant in
investigations is acceptable. However, in independent prosecutions
interference by the Attorney General or his assistant in investigations
is not acceptable. This can be easily achieved through a legislative
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amendment that would consider such intervention a crime.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Egyptian judiciary enjoys a comprehensive form of independence
from both executive and legislative authorities. However, this indepen-
dence has reached a level of autonomy in many aspects, as it disregards
the borders between the three authorities. As for the question regarding
the authority of the MoJ, it is best illustrated in the judicial nature of the
MoJ and the fact that its senior officers are judges. This question raises
the concern that there is a clear misunderstanding of the rule of separa-
tion of powers and checks and balances between the three authorities.
The elimination of the authority of the Ministry of Justice would not in-
crease the judiciary's independence. Rather, it would lead to a judiciary
that is unaccountable to either the public or other authority.
Finally, this research recommends four points. Firstly, the judiciary
must adopt clear rules of political participation and issue sanctions
for violations. It is unacceptable that rules of banning political
85 participation apply only to opponents of the political regime. The JID
must apply rules equally; they are not a tool of retribution against
political rivals. Secondly, the judiciary must be excluded from the
electoral process to fulfill its main role of protecting the legality of the
process, instead of protecting the process itself. Thirdly, the judiciary
must accept the political responsibility of its acts. It is unacceptable for
an independent judiciary to be above political participation. Fourthly,
a new formulation of the Supreme Judicial Council must be introduced
to reflect a democratic and accountable judiciary to the public, who is
the source of its authority.
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